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HENRY T. LowE* -
The inheritance tax is a neglected child. Born when the family budget
was small, it has grown up in a period of dramatic change amid burgeoning
domestic demands for money, demands which necessarily have looked for
satisfaction to the younger, more productive members of the family. And
we should not be surprised to find that as the revenues it produces become
less and less significant,' so attempts to keep the law current by amend-
ments2 and significant interpretations by the appellate courts are more and
more infrequent; and although any lack of effort be entirely unconscious,
perhaps the administration of the law no longer has the vitality, the parental
solicitude and interest, so requisite for sound growth, health, and domestic
prosperity.
These are thoughts suggested by two recent decisions on significant and
interesting inheritance tax questions, decisions which focus our attention
on two quite different dimensions of a common problem.
*This article contains a discussion of selected Missouri court decisions re-
ported in volumes 333-345, South Western Reporter, Second Series.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. The statistics are interesting; in 1920 inheritance tax receipts were $1.408
million out of total revenue receipts of $9.519 million or almost 15% of the total;
in 1930 inheritance tax receipts were $3.841 million out of total revenue receipts
of $15.591 million or almost 25%; in 1940 inheritance tax receipts were $1.961
million out of total revenue receipts of $43.350 million or approximately 4.5%; for
fiscal year 1949-1950 inheritance tax receipts were $2.675 million out of total
revenue receipts of $115.362 million or slightly less than 1.5%; and for fiscal year
1960-1961 inheritance tax receipts were $5.494 million out of total revenue receipts
of $213.123 million or approximately 2.5%. These figures were taken from The
Biennial Reports of the State Treasurer of Missouri for the respective periods;
for the fiscal year 1960-1961 the figures were taken from the Annual Report of the
Department of Revenue.
2. The basic substantive law provisions are found in §§ 145.010-.040, RSMo
1959. Originally the law was enacted in 1917, Mo. Laws 1917, at 114, § 1-33; and
the following are the principal amendments to the substantive law. In 1931 pro-
visions now found in § 145.020-1(4), RSMo 1959, were added; these pertain to
certain lifetime transfers. Mo. Laws 1931, at 130, § 1. In 1941 exemptions were
added for employee pension and similar type plans and intangibles owned by non-
residents; these are now found in § 145.020-3(1) and (2), RSMo 1959. Mo. Laws
1941, at 280, § 1, and 281, § 1. The exemption for life insurance proceeds, now
found in § 145.020-3(3), was added in 1943. Mo. Laws 1943, at 309, § 1. The
exemption for property passing to a surviving spouse and children, now found in
§ 145.020-3 (4) was added in 1957. Mo. Laws 1957, at 780, § 1.
(73)
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CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH: OsTERoH's ESTATE3
The inheritance tax- is a tax on certain transfers5 of property, a levy
imposed on the privilege of receiving property which traces its incidence to
the death of the transferor. Not limited to transfers by testate or intestate
succession, it reaches out to embrace many common forms of lifetime dis-
position, such as transfers where the donor has reserved the income for his
life or the right to designate who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income and transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after the death of the donor.0 And, of course, as any scheme of death
taxation is ineffective if a person may avoid the tax by giving his property
away just before his death, from the outset transfers in contemplation of
death (whatever that elusive language may mean in a particular context)
have been subject to the tax.7 But, unlike many states, Missouri has no
gift tax law, and hence in the administration of the inheritance tax the role
of contemplation of death must be central if the tax is to retain its integrity.
Thus it comes as a distinct surprise to find that a person may avoid
the inheritance tax altogether, even at the twenty-third hour, by the simple
expedient of establishing joint ownership. We now learn that the creation
of a joint tenancy in personal property within two years of death is not a
statutory transfer, and since jointly owned property is not subject to taxs
the property passes to the surviving joint owner free of tax. What is the
basis for this conclusion? The reasoning proceeds like this: the principal
characteristic of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship; Missouri im-
poses no tax on property passing by right of survivorship; the interest which
passed to the survivor in this case did so by virtue of one owner outliving
the other; hence there was no statutory transfer when the joint estate first
came into being. And we are left with this pleasant fiction, the right of
survivorship, a right which is at best a tentative, halting type of interest,
one which must bide its time and wait patiently for the expiration of the
other interest, a death watch, however, which may end in tragedy for the
observer.
But if the right of survivorship is a tentative, halting type of interest,
there are other interests of a joint owner which are not. A joint tenant
3. Estate of Osterloh v. Carpenter, 337 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1960).
4. C. 145, RSMo 1959.
5. § 145.020-1, RSMo 1959.
6. § 145.020-1(3) and (4), RSMo 1959.
7. § 145.020-1(3), RSMo 1959.
8. Estate of Gerling v. Department of Revenue, 303 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1957).
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shares the fruits of ownership9 (rents, profits, dividends and interest) and
without the consent of his co-owner may sever the tenancy;10 by a simple
sale or other assignment of his interest he may realize presently its full
economic benefit. One would like to think in the mid-twentieth century that
revenue laws should be construed in a manner consonant with the economic
substance of the transaction and that the niceties of the property law,
whatever their significance may be in other contexts, should defer here to a
more sturdy, direct approach. May we not assert with some suasion that
it does no violence to the term "transfer" to say that it embraces a transac-
tion of this nature? Indeed comparable legislation has been so construed
for years.:1 And certainly it involves no more of a logical inconsistency to
say that while jointly held property is not subject to the inheritance tax,
the creation of a joint tenancy in contemplation of death is, than to say a
completed lifetime gift is not subject to the tax but the same gift if made in
contemplation of death is. In either case there is a transfer, and the ques-
tions for determination are the amount1 2 of the transfer and the state of
mind of the donor at the time of the transfer.
The parties stipulated the salient facts, but curiously, they did not
mention some things we would like to know: Did the decedent retain pos-
9. As it did in the Osterlok case, the Missouri Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that a joint tenancy in personal property is permissible under Missouri
law. Recently the court discussed the subject at some length in Longacre v.
Knowles, 333 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1960), where it points out that a joint tenant in
personalty has equal rights to share in the enjoyment of the property while both
joint owners are alive.
10. Apparently there is no Missouri case which holds that a right of severance
exists with respect to a joint tenancy of personal property. This would seem to
follow, however, since the right clearly exists with respect to real property, Mc-
Clendon v. Johnson, 337 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1960); and the rules for joint tenancies
of personal property in other respects are the same as those that pertain to real
property. See Longacre v. Knowles, supra note 9 and, Johnston v. Johnston, 173
Mo. 91, 73 S.W. 202 (1903).
11. This reference is to the provisions of the federal gift tax law, where
similarly the incidence of taxation is traced to a "transfer." INr. REv. CODE OF
1954 §§ 2501 and 2511; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (5) (1958). Prior to the enact-
ment of Section 2515 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the creation of a tenancy
by the entirety where husband furnished all the consideration was held to constitute
a transfer from husband to wife for gift tax purposes. Commissioner v. Hart, 106
F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939); Commissioner v. Logan, 109 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1940);
Lilly v. Smith, 96 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1938). Of course the entirety cases did
not turn on a right of severance but rather on the likelihood of the wife outliving
the husband, but the basis for holding a transfer took place at the time of creation
of the tenancy is similar in the two cases.
12. The regulations under the federal gift tax law provide that the amount
of the transfer is one-half the value of the property where one of two joint owners
furnishes all the consideration. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (5) (1958).
19621
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session of the stock certificates until her death? Did she share the income
receipts with her co-owner during her lifetime? Did she pay income tax
on the entire receipts or only on one-half? Apparently the parties believed
these facts were unimportant and the court was content to decide the case
on the ground a joint estate was created. But it is not at all unlikely that
questions like these will assume some importance, for in future cases the
courts may be called upon to decide if the donor created a joint estate be-
fore death; and the Director, instead of conceding the battle, will probably
retreat to the inner fortress where "intention" and "delivery" are very ef-
fective close range weapons.
What is the significance of this for one who plans with an eye to saving
taxes? For the large estate subject to the federal estate tax, there may be
little since jointly held property is subject to the federal estate tax,13 con-
siderations other than death taxes will likely dictate the form of disposition,
and in most cases the plan has been shaped before contemplation of death
becomes a serious problem. But even here where age, and hence contempla-
tion of death, is a problem substantial tax savings may be possible. And in
smaller estates one may hazard a prediction that planning to save inheri-
tance taxes undertaken at the twenty-third hour will become an increasingly
popular activity.
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT: TOMPKINS ESTATE"4
Here A, who died in 1913, established a trust in her will for the benefit
of certain named relatives of whom B, a niece, was one. In addition to an
income interest, B had an unlimited testamentary power to appoint a share
of the corpus of the trust. In 1942 B partially released her power by restrict-
ing it to her own descendants and their spouses; and when she died in 1951
she exercised the power in favor of her grandchildren and her daughter-in-
law. The Director successfully contended that B's exercise of the power was
a taxable transfer.
Beyond a skillful and elaborate piece of statutory interpretation there
is nothing in the decision particularly novel, and to this writer the result
seems proper, indeed necessary. B's executrix resisted on two grounds, one
that the ultimate recipients were taxed twice on their receipt of the property,
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2040 (inclusion is based on the consideration
furnished by the decedent).
14. Estate of Tompkins v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1960).
[Vol. 27
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and the other that due to a peculiarity of the wording of the statute the
legislature did not accomplish what it obviously had intended to do, which
was to treat the exercise of a power of appointment as a taxable transfer.
The argument on double taxation proceeded on this basis: an in-
heritance tax is a levy imposed on the right to receive property; A's estate
paid inheritance taxes when she died in 1913; at least some of B's appointees
were named by A as takers in default of appointment and thus were like
contingent remaindermen; and to tax these appointees on B's death in
1951 would be to impose two taxes on their receipt of a single property. Of
course the argument ignores the significance of the unlimited power B had,
which she voluntarily restricted in 1942, and for this reason the court quite
properly rejected it.
The other defense, based on the wording of the statute, presented a
rather more sophisticated challenge. Originally enacted in 1917, and car-
ried forth since then unchanged, the section on powers of appointment
provides that an exercise of a power shall be deemed a "transfer." Not
satisfied with this statement the draftsmen added a descriptive clause; the
exercise of the power is a transfer "taxable . . . in the same manner as
though the property [subject to the power] ... belonged absolutely to the
donee of suck- power and had been bequeathed or devised by the donor by
will .... -15 Here is an ambiguity of the first order. Do the words, the "donee
of the power" and "the donor," refer to the same or different people? If
they refer to the same person, what a curious use of language to impute to
the legislature, at one point to refer to the decedent B as the donee of the
power and in the same breath refer to her as the donor! But if the terms
refer to different persons, then B is the donee of the power and A is the
donor and the statute becomes meaningless, for the exercise cannot be a
taxable transfer by B if it is to be treated as a bequest or devise by A. The
court did the only decent thing and preserved the statute; the "donee of the
power" and "the donor" are the same person.
While interesting in view of the grammatical difficulties this decision
probably does not merit extended comment. The decision is noteworthy
because it focuses our attention on the statutory section", on powers of
appointment. Surely all will agree that few areas of the law are more
recondite and unintelligible than that relating to the common law of powers
of appointment. Here subtle difficulties abound; and the tyro ventures
15. § 145.030, RSMo 1959. (Emphasis added.)
16. § 145.030, RSMo 1959.
1962]
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into these gloomy regions only with feelings of deepest anxiety. General
and special powers-powers collateral, appendant and in gross-exclusive
and nonexclusive powers-these and a host of other complications people
this strange land.17
But regardless of their antecedents we can hardly exaggerate the present
importance of powers of appointment, an importance which is traceable in
large measure to the increasing use of trusts in lifetime and testamentary
estate planning. By a judicious use of powers in a trust an owner of prop-
erty may plan his disposition far into the future without being forced to
predict or anticipate with any degree of certainty the course of future
events; in short he introduces flexibility into his plan without disturbing his
basic goals. And if properly advised he can at the same time effect substan-
tial savings under the federal revenue laws.18 Unquestionably the current
federal legislation promotes the wide and varied use of powers in inter vivos
trusts and wills, and where the impact of the federal tax laws is so much
greater than the impact of local revenue legislation the lawyer planning for
the future disposition of his client's wealth will look first and primarily to
the federal law where the guide lines are rather precisely stated.
In the light of recent experience under the federal law our 1917 statute
poses some obvious and fundamental questions: What is a power of ap-
pointment for inheritance tax purposes? Is there any distinction to be
drawn between a general power and a special power, such as we find in the
common law and by definition in other schemes of death taxation? 19 If not,
at what point does a special power cease to be a power at all for inheritance
tax purposes? Does the statute apply only to individuals or can a corpora-
17. For one anxious to explore these mysteries in any detail a good starting
point is 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 23.1-23.13 (Casner ed. 1952).
18. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has detailed provisions on powers of
appointment for the income, estate and gift tax areas. For the income tax con-
sequences of the use of powers in trusts see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 671-78 and
particularly §§ 674, 676, 677 and 678; for the estate tax provisions see INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954 § 2041; and for the gift tax provisions see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2514.
19. The power in Tompkins at the time of B's death was a limited and thus
probably a special power, but the power originally was general. The distinction
between a general and special power is made in the federal law, INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954 § 2041, and in several state inheritance tax statutes: ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42-1511 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1304 (1953); HAWAII REV.
LAws § 122-4 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 155, § 6-A (Supp. 1961); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9262-04 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. TAx LAws § 249-r; N.D. REV. CODE§ 57-37-07 (Supp. 1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 989e (Supp. 1961); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 118.010(5) (Supp. 1961); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 122A, art.
14.01 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 72.01(5) (1959).
[Vol. 27
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tion be subject to tax?20 What is the effect of the release or exercise of a
power if made in contemplation of death?2 ' What is the effect of disclaimer,
renunciation or lapse?22 Apparently, nonexercise is treated in the same
manner as an exercisess but how is nonexercise distinguished from disclaimer,
renunciation or release? Is the inter vivos exercise of a power a transfer if
the donee thereby reserves a life estate, the power to designate who shall
enjoy the property or other incidents of ownership and control' 24
I haven't the temerity to suggest answers to these questions, 2 but it
goes without saying that these and untold other questions lurk menacingly
within the four corners of the hundreds of wills and trust instruments
executed weekly. Why aren't these questions raised and litigated? One may
only surmise, but in any assessment neglect would play an important part;
and we are constantly reminded that today's child of neglect may be the
occasion for tomorrow's crusade.
The statute on powers is a good example of the neglect from which the
inheritance tax law suffers. In itself this is quite a minor tragedy; the music
20. The section on powers expressly provides: "Whenever any person or
corporation shall exercise the power of appointment . . . such appointment shall
be deemed a transfer .... ." § 145.030, RSMo 1959. The language is curious; and the
legislative intent is far from clear.
21. The federal estate tax law refers expressly to the exercise or release of a
general power of appointment in contemplation of death. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954
§ 2035(b); and a number of state inheritance tax statutes have similar references:
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1511 (1956); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 122-4(a) and (b)(1955); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9262-04 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. TAX LAWS § 249-r; N.D.
REV. CODE § 57-37-07 (Supp. 1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 989e (Supp.
1961).
22. The federal estate tax law has express provisions concerning renunciation,
disclaimer and lapse, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2041; and some state statutes have
similar provisions: Aiuz. REV. STAT. § 42-1511 (1956); N.Y. TAx LAws § 249-r;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4422-7 (Supp. 1960).
23. The Missouri statute on powers provides that to the extent of the omis-
sion or failure to exercise a power of appointment "a transfer ... shall be deemed
to take place." § 145.030, RSMo 1959.
24. Certain lifetime dispositions, supra note 6, may be taxable transfers. §
145.020(3) and (4), RSMo 1959. The federal estate tax law specifically provides
that an inter vivos exercise of a power may cause the property to be a part of
the gross estate, if a transfer of owned property in the same circumstances would
be subject to section 2036 (transfers with retained life estates), section 2037
(transfers taking effect at death) or section 2038 (revocable transfers). INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954 § 2041. Some states have enacted similar provisions: Ariz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §42-1511 (1956); N.Y. TAx LAws § 249-r; N.D. REV. CODE § 57-37-07
(Supp. 1961).
25. Apparently no one has attempted a detailed analysis of this statute. The
section is only mentioned in passing in a recent article on powers of appointment
which emphasizes drafting problems. Allen, Powers of Appointment and the Draft-
ing of Missouri Wills, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 408.
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of these particular spheres is not particularly pleasing to our ears, when we
listen; ordinarily it is not loud enough to arrest our attention; and any
disharmony here we tolerate in comfort. Nevertheless the section on powers,
and for that matter the entire inheritance tax law, can and should be im-
proved; and as we cast about for new sources of revenue we should not
overlook the opportunities in an existing scheme which can do a good deal
more than we have asked of it, if we will only take the time and interest
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